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The Fact of the Given From a Realist Idealist Perspective 
 
Abstract 
In his well-known Mind and World and in line with Wilfrid Sellars’ (1991) or “that great foe 
of ‘immediacy’” (ibid., 127) Hegel, McDowell claims that “when Evans argues that 
judgments of experience are based on non-conceptual content, he is falling into a version of 
the Myth of the Given” (1996, 114). In this paper, on the basis of a) a mainly Kantian ‘realist 
idealist’ world view and b) an explication of Kant’s concept of the “given manifold” (CPR, 
e.g. B138), I will argue that Kant and Evans (1982, chs. 5.1–5.2) were indeed mistaken in 
their versions of the given, but that Sellars and his student McDowell were even more 
mistaken and that, in the end, there would appear to be a non-conceptual and (thus) non-
propositional given in perceptual experience from which we unconsciously and automatically 
infer to our first perceptual beliefs. 
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1. Defining ‘Realist Idealism’ 
The following discussion is based on a certain ontological and epistemological or 
‘epistemontological’ world view. Before starting the discussion proper and in order to prevent 
confusion at a later point, I will first introduce the three main theses of my respective and 
largely Kantian (CPR) but also Berkeleyian (PHK) world view of ‘realist idealism’ (for a 
much more in-depth discussion of this, see Flock draft version 2.2). First and contrary to 
direct realism and sense-datum theory which are both physical realist positions, realist 
idealism is a physical anti-realist or, more specifically, a ‘noumenal realist’ position – i.e. it 
proposes that it is not ‘the’ physical world which is real, but rather Kant’s noumenal world of 
things in themselves which, if one were to take into account the early Wittgenstein’s claim 
that “The world is the totality of facts, not of things” (TLP, §1.1), one could perhaps also 
refer to as ‘facts in themselves.’ Furthermore and due to also borrowing from Berkeley, realist 
idealism also claims that minds are real which, given that brains are physical, that everything 
physical is regarded as anti-real and that something about us has got to be real, is only 
consistent. 
 Secondly and contrary to direct-realism but in line with sense-datum theory, realist 
idealism is not a ‘direct objectivist’ but a ‘direct subjectivist’ position – i.e. it proposes that 
our direct or immediate perceptual awareness is never of something real (i.e. of something 
that exists ontically objectively or mind- or subject-independently) but always of something 
anti-real (i.e. of something that exists ontically subjectively or mind- or subject-dependently). 
 Thirdly, more in line with direct realism and contrary to or at least less in line with 
sense-datum theory and even though it is in the end both of the following theses that realist 
idealism endorses due to regarding the physical as part of the greater realm of the mental, 
3 
direct realism is more specifically a ‘direct physicalist’ and not so much or only more 
generally a ‘direct mentalist’ position – i.e. it maintains that our direct or immediate 
perceptual awareness is more specifically of something physical, more generally of 
something mental and most certainly not of something non-physical as sense-datum theorists 
would claim. 
 This, in essence, is also what Kant proposed in somewhat different terms. Contrary to 
Kant, however, I speak of “realist idealism” as opposed to “transcendental idealism” (CPR, 
A368–370) mainly to fight off the misconception that idealism is opposed to realism. Kantian 
and even Berkeleyian idealism, however, are ontologically realist positions too since, even 
though they do not regard the physical as real, they clearly affirm that there is something 
which is real. Thus “realist idealism.” 
 
2. Kant’s and Evan’s Fundamental Mistake: The Notion of Given 
or Perceived Objects 
In the very first paragraph of the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant links the given to the four 
other key concepts of sensibility/Sinnlichkeit, understanding/Verstand, 
intuitions/Anschauungen and concepts/Begriffe via the following claim: “[B]y means of 
sensibility objects are given to us, and it alone supplies us with intuitions. Through 
understanding, on the other hand, objects are thought, and from it arise concepts” (A19/B33). 
 In other words and in order to delve a little bit deeper into those terms and definitions: 
Kant defines “intuitions and concepts” as constituting “the elements of all our cognition” 
(A50/B71) and as belonging to the wider category of sometimes given (A50/B74) 
“presentations/Vorstellungen” (A56/B80). Sensibility and understanding a.k.a. “spontaneity” 
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(B69), “spontaneity of concepts” (A50/B71) or “spontaneity of thought” (A68/B93) are 
regarded as the faculties that produce the respective elements. It is also worth noting that 
Kant defines “(empirical) intuition” as “tak[ing] place only insofar as the [sensible!] object is 
given to us” (A19/B33, addition myself) or as “refer[ring] to the object” (A20/B34; also see 
B72) – i.e. as something like ‘intuition as,’ in order to allude to Wittgenstein’s “seeing as” 
(PI, II, XI, 193ff). This definition, however, in my opinion clashes with Kant’s claims that 
empirical intuitions (A20/B34, A50/B74) are produced purely by sensibility (A19/B33) or 
that they are not a “cognition through concepts” (A68/B93) insofar as the latter definitions of 
intuition as taking place after the objects are given to us would rather suggest the 
involvement of the faculty of understanding, the ensuing process of thought and the elements 
or presentations of concepts. Yet another problem with Kant’s concept of intuition is that 
Kant also commits the mistake of conflating intuitions as processes with intuitions as 
products (e.g. A19/B33). My solution for these two conflations is to explicate intuition as an 
understanding based process of intuition as. 
 In order to return to the originally intended topic though, we see that Kant once again 
reaffirms the claim that “Through receptivity an object is given to us” (A50/B74) in the 
Transcendental Analytic and before suggesting to “give the name sensibility to our mind’s 
receptivity, [i.e., to its ability] to receive presentations insofar as it is affected in [p. 57:] some 
manner” (A51/B75) – i.e. primarily by things in themselves.  
 That claim of objects or certain presentations being given to us, however, is very 
problematic. First of all, it is ambivalent since “object” could be used either for real or non-
real objects and since Kant himself distinguished between “object as appearance” (cf. 
A20/B34: “The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance”) and 
“object as object in itself” (B68) only a few pages earlier and since it would actually make 
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sense to interpret “object” as a real thing in itself if “given” were to be interpreted as 
something like “rendered.” Since that does not seem to be the proper interpretation of the 
verb “given,” since the given is generally to be understood as mental content or more 
specifically as exclusively non-conceptual and (thus) non-propositional mental content and 
since things or objects in themselves do not qualify as any sort of mental content, it seems 
fairly safe to say that Kant is talking about objects as appearances here. 
 Secondly and more importantly, to claim that receptivity/sensibility gives us objects 
as appearance is simply a mistake since the given must not feature any conceptual content 
and since, in my opinion, the identification of something as an object already requires 
conceptual content. As such, it is also the first part of the famous passage “Without 
sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be 
thought” (A51/B75) that is mistaken. To be more explicit about that: Kant apparently thinks 
that conceptual content is only introduced when the “undetermined object” of appearance is 
determined with the aid of understanding, thought and concepts or when an according 
“manifold of the appearance” or “manifold in experience” is “ordered in certain relations” 
(A20/B34) in a likewise manner and with the aid of a number of syntheses (B129ff or A98ff). 
So according to Kant, an object as appearance or an according manifold of appearances that I 
later identify as a laptop or, additionally, as hands, a table, pencils, a calendar, a table, etc. is, 
at the time of ‘purely’ or ‘undeterminedly seeing’ these objects, supposed to still be non-
conceptual content. A generally identical notion would also appear to have been entertained 
by Evans who mentions a “pure case” of perception where “the subject does not recognize 
the [object as a] cat, and has no information about it” (1982, ch. 5.1, 121, addition myself; 
also cf. Sellars’ “inner episodes” (1991, 140)).  
 That notion, however, is a mistake since the use of the basic concepts of unity and 
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separation are already required to ‘perceive’ or rather conceive of objects which are by 
default understood as a unity that is separated from its surroundings. What is all the more 
astounding about Kant committing that mistake is that he even explicitly mentions the 
“concept of divisibility” or that “all judgments are functions of unity among our 
presentations” (A69/B94). Apparently though it did not occur to him that these concepts or 
functions are required for the identification or construction of objects or that the thought 
“This is an object” or “this object” already is a by default conceptual content containing 
judgment or perceptual belief even if the object is or should remain undetermined. In other 
words: Even undetermined physical objects are never perceived via sensibility but always 
intuited as or conceived, i.e. constructed via understanding, thought and concepts. 
 
3. Explicating Kant’s Given Manifold 
Kant’s given manifold which builds on the mistaken notion of given objects could 
nevertheless serve as a given if all conceptual content is removed from it. This is why I 
explicate the manifold in the following manner and in accordance with Kant’s general idea of 
the manifold being “given in the mind—viz., without spontaneity” (B68): Think of the given 
‘Kantio-Flockian manifold’ in perception as something like a newborn’s almost entire 
experience of the physical world: It perceives a manifold of appearances (colors, sounds, etc.) 
but would initially most likely even fail at making out objects within that manifold that we 
most likely could make out even if we were unable to determine those objects by “bring[ing] 
them under concepts” (A51/B75). That at least – i.e. completely independent and devoid of 
any conceptual content – is what a given manifold or any perceptually given must be, because 
otherwise, the given would indeed be nothing but a myth. To rephrase that as an argument: 
P1: The given must only result from or include sensibility and its products; i.e. it must not in 
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any way result from or include understanding (including intuition as) and its products. P2: 
Concepts or conceptual content result from understanding. C: Therefore, the given must not 
result from or include any concepts or conceptual content. 
 
4. The Usual Omission of Unconscious Inferences 
There are a number of very understandable objections against the existence of such non-
conceptual content such as the following one by Sellars: “There is no more such a thing as a 
non-symbolic noticing that something is red, than there is a non-symbolic saying that 
something is red” (1991, 336). In that, Sellars is of course correct: We can neither notice or 
intuit something as red nor speak of red without concepts. The latter is also true for non-
conceptual content which somewhat ironically or paradoxically requires conceptual content 
to be spoken of, thought about or even intuited as non-conceptual content (if you will and 
since this occurred to me in a conversation with Géza Kállay in 2016, call this the ‘Flock-
Kállay paradox of non-conceptual content’). Sellars, however, is sorely mistaken in inferring 
from by default conceptual intuiting, noticing or seeing something as red to the conclusion 
that the given or non-conceptual content is a myth since it is easily conceivable that light of a 
certain wavelength is first given to us via pure sensibility and that, after bringing that still 
non-conceptual content under concepts via understanding, we later see something in the 
manifold as red. 
 What Sellars, McDowell and other proponents of the myth of the given seem to have 
ignored, in other words, is the possibility of unconscious and automatic inferences (cf. 
Helmholtz 1867, ch. 26, or Evans 2008 for on overview over recent developments) that, 
together with concepts, are used to see something in the given manifold of appearance as red, 
as an object or as “these hands here.” Adding such unconscious inferences to the picture also 
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explains why we are generally unable to hold on to or maybe even to notice non-conceptual 
content as such – because non-conceptual content is automatically transformed into actually 
mixed conceptual content without us ever being consciously aware of those processes (if you 
will, call this the ‘Flock-Kállay obscuration of non-conceptual content’). Note furthermore 
that one of the perhaps most obvious confirmations for the existence of unconscious 
inferences is that you automatically understood these words all this time without needing to 
consciously think about how to associate those signs or sounds with meaning. [p. 58:] 
 
5. Three Additional Sellarsian Myths about the Given 
In this section I will expound on section 4 by taking a closer look at three more specific 
Sellarsian myths about the given. The first of these myths can be found in deVries’ (2016, 
sect. 4) reconstruction of the general Sellarsian argument against the given and goes as 
follows: “3. The doctrine of the given is that any empirical knowledge that p requires some 
(or is itself) basic, that is, epistemically independent, knowledge (that g, h, i, … .” Sellars 
seems to be taking that ‘doctrine’ from some of his contemporaries who apparently suffered 
from the mistaken notion that the given has or could have propositional form or content 
(“knowledge”). That, however, is utter nonsense that neither Kant’s nor my own notion of the 
given manifold would support since the given must be entirely non-conceptual, since 
propositions can only be conceptual, and since the given can therefore not have propositional 
form or content. Since knowledge is propositional, the given can therefore also not be 
knowledge. Sellars, in other words, makes the mistake of merely refuting some pseudo-given 
instead of going the hard way of trying to refute Kant’s rather well-conceived given. 
 The second, related and more than just Sellarsian myth is that “4. Inferential relations 
are always between items with propositional form” (2016, sect. 4). Here I once again need to 
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point to Helmholtz (1867, ch. 26) who had the presence of mind to enlarge the ordinary 
picture of by default conscious inferences by counseling that we should also admit according 
unconscious processes into the category of inferences. In a likewise manner, I also think that 
it would be a huge mistake to believe that inferences involve only items with propositional 
form or content since perceptual beliefs such as “Here there are hands” or simply “This is a 
physical object” could just as well be regarded as conclusions that are inferred from the 
manifold of appearance (= non-propositional ‘premise’ no1) and concepts (= non-
propositional ‘premise’ no2) and by means of a logical application of the latter to the former. 
 The third and once again related Sellarsian myth at least as far as Kant or myself are 
concerned is the absurd notion that the given somehow supports the existence of “non-
inferential knowledge” (Sellars 1991, 128). There is no such thing as non-inferential 
knowledge or non-inferential beliefs since all beliefs, including ‘knowledge-beliefs,’ are 
conclusions that result from by default inferential justification. Neither do, as pointed out 
before, Kant or myself claim that the mere “sensing of sense contents” (ibid., 128) or the 
given amounts to knowledge since the given must be entirely non-conceptual and since 
knowledge, beliefs or propositions clearly are conceptual. So much for the disenchantment of 
three additional Sellarsian myths about the given. 
 
6. Conclusion 
With a by default non-conceptual and thus non-propositional given in perception re-
established, it is not only Kant or Evans that generally prevail over Sellars or McDowell in 
this respect. Furthermore, philosophers can also start to add mere coherentism (cf. Steup 
2016, sect. 3.2) as well as traditional foundationalism (cf. Steup 2016, sect. 3.1) to the dustbin 
of history, because if that non-propositional given as well as non-propositional concepts are 
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necessary ‘premises’ in the by default inferential justification of our first perceptual beliefs, 
then a respective version of moderate foundationalism according to which some by default 
propositional beliefs do not depend on other beliefs for their justification is pretty much the 
only remaining option.  
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